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Circumstantial Evidence In Establishing Causal Connection
The South Carolina Supreme Court in a number of decisions
has consistently held that where medical testimony is not relied
on to establish causal connection, lay testimony and other facts
and circumstances may be sufficient to support a conclusion of
causal connection between the claimed disability or death and
the accident. The court has, with equal clarity, established that
when the testimony of medical experts solely is relied upon to
establish causation, then the expert testimony must be that the
death or disability "most probably" resulted from the accident.'
The problem for the practicing attorney in trial court is to
determine whether the presence or absence of medical testimony
is conclusive. In G'ice v. Dickerson2 the court established the
rule that where medical testimony recognized the possibility of
causal connection, the claimant could establish the fact of causal
connection by circumstantial evidence and need not rely solely
upon medical testimony for an award.
Glenn v. Dunean Millss provided a sensible, workable rule for
compensation cases. The court held that where the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the injury or death of the employee are
sufficiently convincing, causation need not be proved by medical
testimony. In this case several employees were repairing a leak
in an air-conditioning unit. In the course of repairs they per-
mitted freon gas to escape, forming a vapor that forced the em-
ployees from the room. Shortly after they returned, the deceased
collapsed and was taken to the hospital. Though he had previous-
ly enjoyed excellent health, he died shortly thereafter. Other
employees testified to ill effects from the gas, contending that
it left them dizzy and with a tight feeling in the chest. The claim-
ant offered a publication from the manufacturer supporting the
inference that exposure to the gas for a sufficient length of time
could prove fatal. The claimant did not offer an autopsy report,
death certificate or other medical evidence establishing the prob-
able cause of death. The only expert testimony was offered by
* Attorney at Law, Greenville, South Carolina.
1. E.g., Grice v. Dickerson, 241 S.C. 225, 127 S.E.2d 722 (1962).
2. Ibid.
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the employer in an attempt to establish that an employee could
not die from the exposure that occurred. In an excellent decision
the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed an award where
death obviously resulted from accidental means, but where med-
ical testimony was not available to meet the "most probable"
rule.
Kennedy v. "Wiliamsaurg County4 again illustrates the prob-
lem confronting the trial attorney who must obtain medical testi-
mony in accord with the rule that medical witnesses must be able
to use the words "most likely or most probably." The reluctance
of medical witnesses to testify that any given medical condition
is "most likely" the result of an accident is particularly true of
doctors who do not frequently testify in the courts. Many times
doctors privately express to an attorney the opinion that an acci-
dent is a causal factor or a causal condition of an injury but are
reluctant to say that the accident was the "most likely cause."
Medicine is not an exact science, and doctors are frequently un-
able to establish proof to support their opinion under rigid cross
examination. In the Kennedy case for example, one medical wit-
ness testified that the causal connection with a possibility. Later
when asked if it was probable, he replied, "yes sir, I'll have
to go along with that."5 Another medical witness stated first
that "it could be a factor,"6 and finally that, "I would feel that
this was the precipitating factor."
The case involved an employee, admittedly injured in a com-
pensable accident, who later developed a totally disabling para-
noid-schizophrenia. The defendants denied that there was any
causal connection between the disability and his injury. The
majority opinion held that although other inferences could be
drawn from the medical testimony, it was the opinion of the
court that "the most probable rule was met," though, in fact, the
words "most probably" and "most likely" were not used by the
testifying physicians. The majority opinion further observed
that there was other evidence, circumstantial in nature, which
tended to support the finding of a causal connection between
the disability and the injury.
This case, together with the Glenn case, is an excellent example
of the importance of lay testimony and circumstantial evidence
4. 242 S.C. 477, 131 S.E.2d 512 (1963).
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in establishing a reasonable inference of causal connection where
the medical testimony is absent or questionable.
In Dennis v. Williams Furniture Corp.8 the claimant failed
to establish sufficient facts to support a claim of compensation.
The medical testimony of the claimant was weak and unsatis-
factory and did not support the contention of the claimant that
his alleged injury had resulted in a ruptured or degenerated disc.
The claimant, although admitting by his testimony that he had
a previous back condition, alleged that his injury aggravated the
pre-existing condition. The court held that whether the absence
of medical testimony under the "most probable" rule was fatal
to any particular case depended upon the facts and circumstances
of each case, and that in this case the claimant had failed to pro-
vide sufficient facts to establish causal connection. The court
further decided that the finding of fact by the commission that
the claim was filed within the statutory time, without stating any
reason therefore, constituted a conclusion of law and was there-
fore reviewable. Although this decision was filed after the Ken-
nedy and Glenn cases, it is easily distinguishable from those
two decisions and does not indicate any restriction of the opinion
in them.
Coverage
In White v. J. T. Strahan Co.9 the deceased performed work
for a pulpwood producer engaged in cutting timber, the logs
being delivered to one party and the pulpwood from the tracts
being delivered to the defendant company. The defendant com-
pany for a stipulated payment each week provided workmen's
compensation coverage for the employer of the deceased. The
employer was exempt from the mandatory provision of the act.
The court concluded that the operation by the employer Jones of
cutting standing timber that produced logs for one party and
pulpwood for the defendant Strahan constituted one action; and
that since the deceased lost his life while engaged in producing
logs, the deceased was engaged in work that was incidental and
necessary to the production of pulpwood for the defendant
Strahan.
Bridges v. Wyandott Worsting Co.10 involved the determina-
tion of whether or not the defendant woolen manufacturer, who
8. 243 S.C. 53, 132 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
9. 244 S.C. 120, 135 S.E.2d 720 (1964).




Published by Scholar Commons,
WoRXMMN's Co0MENSATION SURVEYD
owned and operated its own electric system from which part of
the power to operate the plant was obtained, was engaged in a
part of the general trade and business when it was in the process
of installing a heavier duty power line from the facilities fo the
Duke Power Company to the plant. The plaintiff, an employee
of the Collins Electric Company engaged to perform the work
for the defendant, was injured, and brought this action against
the defendant manufacturer company. The court observed that
the defendant regularly employed a crew of maintenance men
to perform electrical work and acknowledged the difficulty in
laying down any hard and fast rule with regard to activities
such as repair and maintenance. The court held that the main-
tenance and repair of the electrical system was a part of the work
performed by the defendant in the manufacture of woolen goods.
In Sola v. Sunny Slope Farms" the deceased employee per-
formed work at the packing plant of the defendant and addi-
tional work (although the testimony conflicted) at the labor
camp maintained for the employees of the defendant. His work
at the labor camp was done at night, and it was necessary for him
to cross the railroad tracks going from the packing shed to the
labor camp. He was killed crossing the track while travelling
between the two places of employment. The court affirmed an
award by the Industrial Commission based upon the conclusion
that necessary travel between two regular places of work had
the effect of bringing the place of injury within the scope and
course of his employment.
In South Carolina Industrial Comm'n v. Progressive Life Ins.
Co.12 the court affirmed the order of the commission that the
defendant life insurance company was subjected to the Work-
men's Compensation Act where the employee agents received
guaranteed minimum wages plus commissions, had minimum
quotas to meet, were furnished supplies by the defendant, given
limited territories to work, and were subject to the company's
general power to discharge or fire at will. The court held that
the power to terminate the relationship without liability is not
consistent with the relationship of an independent contractor.
Skipper v. Marlowe Mfg. Co.,'3 involved not only the question
of estoppel, extending the time for the filing of a claim, but also
the length of time after the period of estoppel has ended that
11. 244 S.C. 6, 135 S.E.2d 32 (1964).
12. 242 S.C. 547, 131 S.E.2d 694 (1963).
13. 242 S.C. 486, 131 S.E.2d 524 (1963).
1965]
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the claimant had to file a claim. In this case the general manager
of the defendant had told the claimant not to worry about her
accident and that everything would be taken care of. In reliance
upon these assurances, the claimant instructed her attorney to
withdraw her legal action. Six weeks prior to the expiration of
the one year limitation period for filing a claim, the claimant
determined that she could no longer rely upon the defendant's
conduct to take care of her claim. Her claim was filed sixty days
after the estoppel period ended but more than one year had
expired from the date of her accident. The court held that the
length of time after the period of estoppel has ended in which
the claimant has to decide to file a claim has not been determined
in our state. Some authorities allow a claimant a reasonable
time and others allow the claimant a period of time equal to that
designated in the act for filing claims. The court in this case
held that by awarding compensation the commission implicitly
had found that the claimant had proceeded within a reasonable
length of time and such a finding constituted a finding of fact
and therefore would be binding upon the court.
Unusual Exertion Rule
Black v. Barnwefl County'4 is another example of the diffi-
culty that the commission and the court have found in trying
to apply the "unusual exertion rule." The deceased, the sheriff
and jailor of Barnwell County, for some time prior to his death
had suffered from a weak heart. On September 27, 1960, the
deceased was required to make seven or eight trips within ap-
proximately an hour's time up a steep flight of stairs. He suf-
fered a heart attack on the following day. He died within a
period of approximately two weeks. The majority held that there
was no material dispute in the medical testimony as to causal
connection. Since conflicting inference could be drawn from the
evidence as to whether or not the climbing of the stairway con-
stituted an unusual and extraordinary exertion and because the
commission had found as a fact that the claimant did not sustain
any injury by accident, the majority felt that the court was
bound by the finding of the commission as to the failure of the
claimant to establish a compensable accident.
In a strongly worded dissent, Mr. Justice Bussey observed that
the only findings of fact made by the commission were "that the
14. 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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claimant has failed to sustain the burden of proof necessary in
proving his claim as required by many South Carolina Supreme
Court decisions involving such death cases. 'That the claimant
... did not sustain any injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment resulting in his death.' ,,15
On appeal the attorney for the claimant had challenged the
findings as being conclusions of law. Apparently there were no
reasons stated in the record for this finding of fact adopted by
the full commission. In Dennis v. Williams Furniture Go.,16
supra, the court stated that although a finding of the commis-
sion was denominated as a finding of fact, it would be reviewable
as a conclusion of law if no reason for such finding was given. It
is difficult to distinguish between the findings of fact in the
Dennis case, which the court unanimously concluded were only
conclusions of law and thus subject to review, and the findings
of fact in the Blac case which the court approved.
The Dennis decision was a welcome step in the direction of
requiring Industrial Commission awards to clearly distinguish
between findings of fact and legal conclusions. The Blael 17
opinion was disappointing because it affirmed a similar type of
finding of fact that had met with disapproval in the Dennis
case.
15. Id. at 537, 134 S.E.2d at 756.
16. 243 S.C. 53, 132 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
17. The commission award had been made with a record that included med-
ical testimony later ruled incompetent by the circuit court without appeal by
the defendants. Although the ultimate decision of the commission and the court
may have been the same, there is every argument that the case could have been
remanded to the commission with instructions to make clear and reasoned find-
ings of fact as distinguished from conclusions of law.
1965]
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THE LAW CHANGES
S Year after year new statutes are being enacted by
state and federal legislatures and old statutes are
M- being amended, revised, repealed, superseded or -
LI r-enacted.
[1 The vast number of such changes constantly taking
place necessitates a clearing house from which the
members of the Bench and of the Bar can with
both speed and ease obtain the legislative history
II of any code section or statute they desire to -
investigate.
In every state edition of Shepard's Citations as well
I as in Shepard's United States Citations and Shep-
1- ard's Federal Labor Law Citations there are divi-
2 sions covering citations to statutes. These divisions
of the Shepard publications make instantly avail- -
I able to the investigator precisely the information
he needs to keep abreast of the rapidly changing
I state and federal laws.
Upon request we will send you a very useful book-
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